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Introduction
Almost twenty years old, the constructivist turn in international relations scholar-
ship has succeeded in demonstrating the effects of norms, both in guiding the
interactions of states with one another as well as influencing the domestic political
debates that give rise to foreign policy outcomes.1 More recently, scholars have
begun to study empirically the interactions between international and domestic
normative systems. The origins of many international norms have been located in
national understandings of what constitutes appropriate behaviour in a given issue
area. The reverse, however, is also held to be true. Many national-level norms have
been adopted after first finding their articulation in international institutions.
Often the internalisation of international norms is unproblematic because there
are no pre-existing national-level understandings informing appraisals of appropriate
behaviour in a particular issue area. In many cases, however, internationally promul-
gated norms clash with pre-existing national understandings and generate strong
domestic opposition. The uneven pace and extent of norm diffusion across the
international system has produced calls for scholars to examine domestic level
mechanisms and processes for an explanation.2
Although a number of excellent empirical studies have demonstrated how inter-
nationally recognised norms have replaced pre-existing domestic understandings in a
variety of states, most have focused on weak and developing states in the Third
World or the successors to the former communist states of Eastern Europe.3 Because
these states have strong material incentives for adopting the preferred standards of
an international system dominated by the industrialised democracies of the West,
they would appear to constitute a rather ‘weak test’ for the argument that inter-
national norms can change state behaviour through processes of internalisation.
By contrast, the constructivist literature has been largely silent on cases where the
embrace of an international norm is likely to be most difficult: in advanced
industrial democracies with a history of national attachment to a competing norm.
This is unfortunate, as the failure of leading institutional theorists to examine their
claims in cases where powerful states have strong material incentives to reject
international norms has been used by some Realist scholars to reject the entire
research programme.4 As Stephen Krasner repeatedly reminds us, a focus on state
power often provides a sufficient explanation for institutional isomorphism. If the
preferred norms of the most powerful actors in the international system are those
that come to be seen as salient in the domestic politics of weaker states, Realism may
offer a compelling answer for why.5
This article offers an empirical study of a state’s embrace of an international norm
that required it first to distance itself from longstanding national understandings of
appropriate behaviour. Specifically, we examine Japan’s relationship with the trade
liberalisation norm embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Japan was chosen because it is a
highly industrialised, stable democracy with a longstanding tradition of adherence
to mercantilist principles.
Japan joined the GATT in 1955 and by the 1970s had reduced its tariffs to among
the lowest in the world. Nonetheless, for much of this period, Japan maintained
numerous non-tariff barriers, institutions, and other practices that protected national
industries and contravened the fundamental objective of the GATT system: the
liberalisation of trade. This outcome reflected the widespread legitimacy of an alter-
native set of principles in the Japanese polity. Japan’s collective beliefs emphasised
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the importance of mercantilist-inspired state-building priorities and practices to
Japanese security.
Since the 1980s, however, changes in the country’s policy agenda and domestic
institutions indicate that the domestic salience of the GATT’s trade liberalisation
norm has increased, whereas that of competing domestic norms has decreased.
Japan thus represents an ideal case for examining the ways in which international
norms displace national norms and subsequently infuse domestic policy debates. By
investigating the process or processes that produced Japan’s increasing embrace of
the liberalisation norm, we aim to identify conditions that may produce (or mediate
the effects of) such processes in other cases.
We are not engaged in theory testing. Rather, our goal is limited to hypothesis
formation. Because our knowledge of the mechanisms whereby international norms
become salient in domestic politics is limited, our analysis is flexible and process
oriented. It is flexible in that the empirical analysis is not structured by a priori
expectations generated from developed theory. It is process oriented insofar as it
seeks to identify sequences of events rather than macro-correlations that appear to
bring about the domestic salience of international norms.6
Suspecting that there may be multiple causes or mechanisms producing changes
in domestic normative understandings, we adopted an inductive approach to
hypothesis formation. When the goal of research is to identify the variety of differ-
ent patterns giving rise to a particular outcome, efforts to develop structures of
logically linked causal statements on the basis of initial assumptions can pre-
maturely narrow the focus of empirical observation and lead the analyst to overlook
patterns or processes that otherwise might have been observed. We do not reject
deduction as an approach to theory development and testing. Rather, we assert that
a move to deductive hypothesis generation is premature given the underdeveloped
state of theory on the causes of domestic normative change.7
The discussion proceeds in four steps. First, we briefly review the literature linking
international norms to domestic foreign policy debates and highlight the importance
of internalisation – or domestic salience – to analyses of the effects of international
norms on state behaviour. Second, we develop a method for measuring salience in
the domestic political arena. In a third section, we investigate Japanese domestic
politics in an effort to uncover possible causes for increasing salience of the
GATT/WTO trade liberalisation norm in domestic political debates. Finally, we
offer a set of conjectures on the diffusion of international norms in democracies
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with a tradition of adherence to competing ideas and propose steps for further
research.
The importance of domestic salience
Scholars working in the liberal and constructivist perspectives maintain that
international norms will be considered more legitimate and their associated
prescriptions less onerous when they mirror or support values, practices or beliefs
developed in the domestic sphere.8 Such domestic understandings, which comprise
collective beliefs about right and wrong, or means and ends, help to determine the
actions considered legitimate or possible in a policy area. As Peter Hall writes,
‘[p]olicy making takes place within . . . the context of a prevailing set of political
ideas. These include shared conceptions about the nature of society and the
economy, various ideas about the appropriate role of government, a number of
common political ideals, and collective memories of past policy experiences.
Together, such ideas constitute the political discourse of a nation. They provide a
language in which policy can be described within the political arena and the terms in
which policies are judged there.’ 9
National-level collective beliefs and prevailing domestic norms also provide the
policy-making context within which a particular international institution or norm
will take on meaning. International norms that are inconsistent with prevailing
social beliefs and values are unlikely to enjoy high levels of domestic salience
because their prescriptions do not accord with national understandings regarding
appropriate behaviour. When an international norm’s domestic salience is limited, its
invocation in support of a given policy is unlikely to have much domestic effect. In
such cases, the national discourse provides a ‘theory of rejection’.10
The relationship between international and domestic normative structures is not
static. Although the literature acknowledges that domestic belief systems are not
immutable, it has yet to offer a comprehensive explanation for a domestic norm’s
displacement in the face of an alternative international norm. Nonetheless, a number
of important steps have been made in this direction.
Three types of explanations have been developed to explain national normative
change. One approach emphasises the role of hegemonic power in reconstructing a
state’s internal institutions to reflect a new norm’s prescriptions. The success of the
hegemon in socialising the target state has been argued to rest on whether domestic
elites are receptive to the hegemon’s norms, but the precise conditions that make
domestic elites susceptible to the socialising efforts of the hegemon have yet to be
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articulated.11 A second perspective highlights the socialising actions of transnational
actors, who engage, shame, and entrap state leaders.12 This work, as Thomas Risse
observes, succeeds in demonstrating that transnational actors matter, but rarely
addresses ‘the more interesting questions – when and under what conditions do they
matter?’13 A third set of explanations focus on the domestic actors involved in
normative shift.14 But whereas scholars have devoted significant attention to describ-
ing the range of behavioural logics guiding domestic actors, our understanding of
the national level factors conditioning efforts to effect normative change remains
underdeveloped.15
Based on a comprehensive review of scholarship on norms in international
relations, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink proposed a ‘Life Cycle’ model of
norm emergence, diffusion, and internalisation. Recognising that new norms rarely
emerge in a normative vacuum but must instead displace pre-existing normative
standards and conceptions of interest, they suggest that in early stages of the life
cycle the adoption of a new norm will be highly contested in the state’s domestic
politics.16 However, once a critical mass of states adopts an international norm,
other states ‘begin to adopt new norms more rapidly, even without domestic
pressure for such change’. At this stage of the life cycle, ‘the primary mechanism for
promoting norm cascades is an active process of international socialization intended
to induce norm breakers to become norm followers. . . . In the context of inter-
national politics, socialization involves diplomatic praise or censure, either bilateral
or multilateral, which is reinforced by material sanctions and incentives.’17
Although their model appears to conform to the empirical record,18 Finnemore
and Sikkink do not offer a compelling theoretical justification for shifting the level
of analysis from states’ domestic politics to the international system in accounting
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for the effects of norms at later stages in the life cycle. It may be true that ‘states
and state elites fashion a political self or identity in relation to the international
community’, and seek ‘legitimation, conformity, and esteem’.19 But it is unclear
why the widespread acceptance of an international norm in and of itself should
serve to strengthen the position of elites vis-à-vis other domestic actors who
remain committed to long-standing national practices, or render domestic politics
irrelevant.
In an effort to redress these shortcomings, we conducted an analysis of Japan’s
eventual embrace of the international trade liberalisation norm despite a long-
standing commitment to economic nationalism. From the standpoint of Finnemore
and Sikkink’s model Japan presents a deviant case. Japan was a laggard amongst the
industrialised democracies when it came to trade liberalisation. For decades
Japanese elites actively resisted precisely the sort of systems-level dynamics that for
Finnemore and Sikkink best explain normative change.
Measuring norm salience
Before proceeding to empirical analysis we developed a measure to capture
variations in the salience or legitimacy of a norm in the national arena.20 As used
here, a norm is defined as a ‘prescription for action in situations of choice’.21 Norms
can be said to be salient when they are presumptively accepted as a guide to appro-
priate behaviour.22 Salient norms give rise to feelings of obligation and when
violated engender regret or a feeling that the deviation or violation requires justific-
ation. When a norm is salient in the national arena, its invocation by relevant actors
legitimates a particular behaviour or action, creating a prima facie obligation, and
thereby calling into question or delegitimating alternative choices. In this sense,
norms serve as reasons for action rather than causes, and any explanation that seeks
to invoke norms must do more than point to the existence of norms on the one
hand, and norm-consistent behaviour on the other.23
Domestic salience is a continuous variable with values ranging from limited to
high and can be measured in terms of the country’s policy agenda and institutions.
Although discourse is often used as a measure of a norm’s domestic strength, a
focus on the state’s policy agenda provides a more objective and replicable measure.
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The hortatory and justificatory statements of state officials and societal leaders that
constitute a society’s discourse are difficult to measure in an objective manner and
thus raise a number of difficult methodological questions, including what types of
statements matter, how many statements are sufficient, and which domestic actors’
statements matter.
The state’s policy agenda is operationalised in terms of government officials’
statements in the domestic political arena about what steps the country should take,
or intends to take, in the international trade and associated policy areas. Since such
statements often include justifications or explanations for the agenda, they provide
insight into the domestic standing of the norm through a communicative rather than
a behavioural measure. Precisely because a range of policy choices can be consistent
with a given norm, and because it is the political elite who make the concrete
decisions on how to interpret a norm in a given context, a focus on policy agenda
provides a better indication of the norm’s ‘meaning’ in a particular political context
than would an analysis of the broader societal discourse or policy choice more
generally. Understanding the meaning of a norm, especially the exceptions or
reservations that elites acknowledge as limiting or conditioning its operability, is
essential for efforts to assess its standing in the national arena.
The domestic salience of an international norm can be said to be high when an
examination of the state’s policy agenda and institutions reveal the norm’s objec-
tives, prescriptions, and proscriptions to be largely uncontested and routinely
invoked to justify specific policy choices. The state’s policy agenda will privilege the
issues central to the international institution associated with the norm. The norm
will be enmeshed in the state’s institutions through regulations that reinforce
practices associated with the norm or allow domestic groups to complain about
violations of the norm and identify and eliminate contradictory practices. Moreover,
a state unit might be created to monitor and enforce domestic compliance. In effect,
the domestic salience of an international norm increases the more it is incorporated
in national institutions, and mechanisms exist to reproduce and reinforce its
objectives domestically.
Salience is moderate when the state’s policy agenda and institutions incorporate
the norm’s prescriptions, but institutions enabling countervailing normative claims
continue to exist. The policy agenda will reflect this ambivalence, as elites continue
to debate the merits of the norm and raise reservations and arguments limiting its
applicability across a range of issue areas. The norm may be embedded in a state
institution, but adequate procedures for monitoring and enforcing compliance are
absent.
Salience is limited when the norm remains nominally on the policy agenda. This
development may result from the state’s decision to join the international institution
that produced the norm or oversees it, or acceptance of the international convention
or treaty that promulgates the international norm. This action is likely to be an
exception in light of the full range of issue areas associated with the international
norm. Such an examination will uncover a host of institutions reinforcing competing
norms, the absence of the international norm’s institutionalisation into domestic
agencies’ practices, laws or administrative procedures, and contradictory initiatives
on the policy agenda. In this case, the country’s policy agenda and institutions serve
to reinforce a competing national norm or norms, leading elites to question the
validity of the international norm in the national arena.
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The evolving salience of the GATT/WTO’s liberalisation norm in Japan
This section explores the evolution of Japan’s embrace of the GATT’s trade liberalis-
ation norm. This international institution and its normative tenets have been
defined, codified, strengthened, and refined through a series of international negoti-
ations and treaties beginning with the creation of the GATT in 1947 and leading to
the establishment of the WTO in 1995. Although the WTO and its predecessor
comprise numerous normative obligations,24 the central normative component of
this economic order is contained in the Preamble of the GATT: ‘the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce’. Policies consistent with liberalisation include
the reduction of tariff barriers and the elimination of subsidies, quotas, and other
less transparent forms of discrimination against imports such as regulations. As the
GATT evolved and expanded into the WTO, the liberalisation norm has been
applied to new areas of trade, most recently the service and agricultural industries.
The empirical material focuses on the 1970s to the present, since Japan’s embrace
of mercantilism during the earlier postwar period has been well documented. To
allow for reproduction of the results, guard against translations biased in favour of
the argument forwarded here, and increase the prospects of inter-coder reliability,
independent English language translations of the original Japanese material are
cited whenever possible. The longitudinal study shows that the liberalisation norm
reached high salience in Japan in the 1990s, but only after three periods of intense
political activity on the part of domestic agents interested in effecting change: one in
the early 1980s, one in the mid-1980s, and one in the mid-1990s. Although the norm
attained high salience by the end of the twentieth century, the case study does not
claim that Japan has become a liberal state similar to the United States.25 Its claims
are more limited: the salience of the GATT/WTO liberalisation norm in Japan has
increased along several measures.
Limited salience: pre-1970
During the postwar period Japan further developed an identity in the economic
sphere forged during the Meiji period (1868–1912).26 Dating back to the arrival of
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Commodore Perry’s ‘black ships’, elites believed that Japan would remain vulnerable
to foreign domination so long as the country’s economic development and military
security lagged behind that of the West. Japanese elites identified the country’s
security with its level of industrialisation, particularly its ability to substitute manu-
factured imports with domestic production. Put otherwise, strong, domestic industries
became the means by which the country would ‘catch up’ with the West and
overcome its late-developer status more generally. Mercantilist practices and values
soon became part of the country’s latecomer identity; the domestic economy was
protected from foreign imports and export industries were promoted and protected.
A panoply of procedures and practices, some explicit and others implicit, institu-
tionalised this strategy. Among these were the 1949 Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Law (which ‘enacted the principle of interdiction of any external
economic transaction not explicitly authorized by law, decree or administrative
act’),27 the Export and Import Trading Act of 1952 (which permitted Japanese firms
to form cartels for the purpose of exports), the Small and Medium Enterprise Law
of 1957 (which allowed business mergers to reduce excessive competition), the
Department Store Law of 1956 (which gave local chambers of commerce the ability
to prevent the opening of large stores), the Basic Law for the Modernization of
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises of 1963 (which delineated a series of standards
for products, plants and quality control), and administrative guidance (which
enabled Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) officials informally to
regulate economic activity).
On joining the GATT in 1955, Japan maintained a reservation to Article 12,
allowing it to continue its import quota control system. No additional measures
were taken to implement the treaty in the sense of revising contradictory domestic
laws or transforming the treaty into national law.28 At the same time, 14 of the then
34 member countries invoked Article 35 against Japan, thereby denying Japan the
benefits of their reduced tariffs.29 This action reflected these countries’ fear that
Japanese exports would overwhelm their industries. In an effort to end the use of this
article, the government justified liberalisation ‘“as a necessary cost” or “sacrifice” that
Japan had to pay in order to secure membership in the international club of major
industrialized countries’.30 Tariffs were removed selectively and incrementally so that
sectors of the economy could be protected and promoted. The domestic reaction to
this process is instructive regarding the status of liberalisation in the polity. As
Chalmers Johnson writes, ‘[i]t is hard to recapture today the crisis atmosphere that
existed in Japanese industrial circles during 1961. The press prattled on endlessly
about “the second coming of the black ships”, “the defenselessness of the Japanese
islands in the face of attack from huge foreign capitalist powers”, and “the readying
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of the Japanese economy for a bloodstained battle between national capital and
foreign capital”.’31
From limited to moderate salience: 1975–1990
These liberalisation initiatives were followed by those emerging from the Kennedy
Round negotiations (1964–1967). The government reduced tariff rates, in some cases
beyond those agreed to at the Kennedy Round, and by 1975 reduced the number of
import quotas from 122 to 27.32 Following these actions, the country’s imports from
the European Community (EC) and the United States doubled. Nevertheless, other
signs remained problematic as far as Japan’s major trading partners were concerned.
For example, by 1977, Japan’s trade surplus was $6 bn with the United States and
$4 bn with the EC, and industrial country products accounted for just 20 per cent of
all Japanese imports, which paled in comparison to 53 per cent of US imports and
66 per cent of West Germany’s.33 Japan’s trade partners felt that its imports of
manufactured goods were low relative to its GNP and as a percentage of its total
imports. Accordingly, they demanded that Japan open its market to foreign goods,
asking that 92 specific non-tariff barriers be dismantled.34 As Japan’s surpluses grew,
the pressure on the country became coupled with threats of retaliation in the form
of protectionist restrictions against its exports. This pressure and its penalty were
worrisome to Japanese public and private sector officials for at least two reasons.35
First, the United States and the EC represented significant markets for Japanese
products. In 1976, 10.8 per cent and 23.6 per cent of Japanese exports went to the EC
and the United States respectively.36 Second, access to these markets was important
since Japan was recovering from the economic downturn caused by the first oil
shock.
Foreign pressure led many within the polity to seek a shift in the country’s trade
strategy.37 The strongest proponent of the liberalisation norm was the Keidanren
(the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations), which feared a protectionist
response from the country’s trade partners unless Japan reduced its trade surplus.
This organisation, a federation of more than 100 major industrial associations and
nearly 1,000 individual firms, is the largest peak business association in Japan.
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The Keidanren’s interest and efforts in changing the country’s trade strategy also
reflected a transformation of its membership. A growing number of Japanese firms
had increased their dependence on overseas markets and as the number of global
Japanese firms increased, the Keidanren increased its support for liberalisation at
home as a means to reduce frictions with Japan’s major trading partners. The
chairman of the Keidanren’s Committee on Foreign Trade captured the organis-
ation’s position: ‘If we ignore foreign criticisms of Japan . . . there is the serious
danger that the forces of protectionism [will be] set loose to destroy the liberal
trading system. What we must appreciate more than anything else is the fact that
freeing our market to foreign imports is in our own interest in the sense that the
Japanese people can have access to the products of the best quality available in the
world at the cheapest prices.’38 To do so, the federation sought to draw the govern-
ment’s attention to the fact that piecemeal, reactive tariff cuts or other concessions
would be insufficient to reduce a trade conflict given the increasing magnitude of
the country’s trade surplus. Instead, the Keidanren argued in 1983 ‘that the current
trade-related regulatory systems should be internationalized by accepting foreign
standards and by abandoning double inspection and testing’.39 It sought to influence
the government in many ways in the early 1980s: meeting with the relevant
ministries; cooperating with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) Special
Committee for International Economic Measures; and ultimately organising a series
of meetings, involving nearly 250 trade specialists to discuss and recommend specific
remedies to trade-related regulations.40
While the governments of Prime Ministers Takeo Fukuda (1976–1978) and
Masayoshi Ohira (1978–1980) lowered tariffs and removed some non-tariff barriers,
a shift in the salience of liberalisation did not occur until the Suzuki government
(1980–1982). This government concluded, in the words of its foreign minister, ‘that if
things are to be left unattended, there will be some serious problems with Japan’s
major trade partners’.41 Reflecting the perceived immediacy of the crisis, Prime
Minister Zenko Suzuki told the Keidanren in December 1981 that his government
‘will positively tackle the problem of reducing Japan’s swollen trade surplus in the
interest of curbing overseas protectionist moves and upholding the principle of free
trade’.42 The government submitted the Tokyo Round agreements to the Diet for
ratification and made ‘extensive revisions to its domestic laws and regulations, in
order to bring them into conformity with the agreements. For example, the Customs
Tariff Law and the Cabinet Orders concerning countervailing and anti-dumping
duties were amended to implement the Subsidies Agreement and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement’.43 Additionally, the government created several new institutional units to
promote imports and to identify government policies that hindered imports. Most
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significant among these was the Office of the Trade Ombudsman (OTO). The OTO’s
(subsequently, Office of the Trade and Investment Ombudsman) writ was to resolve
market access complaints, lodged by domestic or foreign entities, in accordance with
‘six criteria: reduction of government intervention in the market; conformity with
international standards; acceptance of foreign test data; clarification and quantific-
ation of standards; simplification and acceleration of testing procedures; and
development of Japanese standards in a transparent environment’.44 Given the
OTO’s explicit import promotion objective, this institutional innovation served to
replicate and reinforce the liberalisation norm in the national arena.45
Suzuki’s successor, Yasuhiro Nakasone, took additional steps that helped to
reinforce the liberalisation norm’s moderate salience. On taking office, Nakasone
was convinced that Japan faced a critical juncture. As he queried to the Japanese
public: ‘Will the Japanese economy – and our own businesses – be safe in the face of
the increasingly tough US and EC demands on Japan for export curbs and increased
imports? ’46 Fearing the possible deleterious effects of the status quo, Nakasone
embraced trade liberalisation. For example, Nakasone stated before the Diet in
February 1984 that he had been ‘made even more aware than ever of the enormity
of international expectations of Japan as our status within the international com-
munity has improved. To this end, the government is first working to achieve those
good international relations so indispensable to Japan. This means striving for
balanced expansion in trade, promoting further market opening, import promotion,
export moderation in certain products, and preparations for the start of a new round
of multilateral trade negotiations, as well as striving strenuously to maintain the free
trade system in the face of a rising international tide of protectionism.’47
To curb the then intensifying protectionist sentiment of the US Congress,
Nakasone appeared on national television in April 1985. He urged the Japanese
population to embrace imports and announced a series of initiatives that would
appear in the Action Program for Improved Market Access. While Nakasone hoped
that his actions would placate the United States, they had a second, more funda-
mental goal. As one Japanese government official explained, ‘[t]he aim (of import
promotion) is not to make them (the Japanese) buy – the amount is negligible – but
to stop them from opposing the idea of increasing imports’.48 In this vein, the
Action Program’s report argued that government intervention should henceforth be
on the basis of ‘free in principle, limit as exceptions’, the converse of existing
practices. It also recommended several institutional changes, including the strengthen-
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ing of the OTO, the creation of transparent government procurement procedures,
and the amendment of 31 laws affecting standards and certifications for 88
products.49 While the programme placed trade liberalisation squarely on the agenda,
it did not go as far as Nakasone had hoped in transforming the Japanese system,
since several of the Diet’s zoku or special interest factions reduced the programme’s
scope and immediacy.50
Recognising that he could not achieve fundamental reform through normal policy
channels, Nakasone soon established the Advisory Group on Economic Structural
Adjustment for International Harmony, or the often-called Maekawa Commission
after its chairman, Haruo Maekawa the former governor of the Bank of Japan.51
Reflecting Nakasone’s selection of the commission’s 17 members, the Maekawa
Report, released in April 1986, sought ‘to orient the economy toward international
harmony . . . [through] basic transformations in the nation’s trade and industrial
structures.’52 It recommended the greater opening of Japan’s market to agricultural
and manufactured imports and the ‘thorough promotion of deregulation’, abiding
by the idea of ‘freedom in principle, restrictions only as exceptions’ introduced by
the Action Program as well as new rules negotiated at the GATT. ‘With regard to
products subject to quantitative import restrictions’, the Maekawa Report stated,
‘efforts should be made to improve market access under the future perspective for
making the Japanese market more open, while taking account of developments in
the relevant consultations and negotiations including the GATT new round’.
This report placed deregulation on the policy agenda, a significant step given the
country’s tradition of using regulations not simply to restrict market entry or protect
individual firms or sectors, but also to set prices and establish permissible economic
activity more generally.53 While LDP governments between 1989 and 1993 established
committees to explore the elimination of regulations, the number of regulations
actually increased between 1985 and 1992 at the rate of 1.4 per cent per year.54 Some
attribute this to the institutional context; regulation tends to be made at the sectoral
level between interest groups and bureaucrats, the two groups most likely to be
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harmed by deregulation.55 Lonny E. Carlile and Mark C. Tilton offer a second
reason: ‘because Japanese economic regulation mechanisms perform so many social
regulation functions, economic regulatory reform frequently has to be accompanied
by the construction of compensating arrangements in other policy arenas, thereby
greatly expanding and complicating the issues to be tackled in realizing a given
regulatory reform initiative’.56
The Maekawa Report also expanded the liberalisation agenda to agricultural
products. When Nakasone took office, Japan maintained import quotas on 22
agricultural products and the government provided price supports for several others.
This strategy, institutionalised by the 1942 Staple Food Control Act and the 1961
Agricultural Basic Law, resulted in high domestic food prices relative to foreign prices
and massive subsidies for national farmers. These mercantilist practices continued for
several reasons, not least of which was the belief that food self-sufficiency was a
matter of national security. 57 The domestic consensus regarding the legitimacy of
Japan’s agricultural policy was strongest with respect to rice: a ban on imports was
established in 1969, and the Diet passed resolutions in 1980, 1984, and 1988 against
rice market liberalisation.58
From moderate to high salience: 1990 to 2000
Agricultural liberalisation remained on the agenda during the tenure of Nakasone’s
successor, Noboru Takeshita, thanks to the US decision to file several GATT
complaints against Japanese agricultural quotas. When a GATT panel ruled against
Japan in late 1987 for its practices on 10 of the 12 products, the government, fearing
international isolation, removed quotas on all but the two most politically sensitive.59
Even so, the government paid an unprecedented price for its concessions: the LDP
lost its majority in the Upper House election in July 1989. Consequently, the
government’s strategy at the Uruguay Round negotiations was that ‘basic foodstuffs
should be exempt from import liberalization requirements, and argued that countries
heavily reliant on food imports need to maintain self-sufficiency in basic foods in the
interests of food security’.60 This strategy, which was largely geared to leaving intact
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the country’s import ban on rice, left the Japanese government unable to propose
concessions on agricultural trade that might have helped to avoid the breakdown in
the GATT negotiations in December 1990.61
The Keidanren again played a leading role in pressing for change. According to
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, the Keidanren ‘spearheaded the campaign for agricultural
reform and liberalisation of agricultural trade, and the federation’s views have played
a catalytic role in beginning the transformation’.62 It argued that a failure to
liberalise the country’s agricultural sector would jeopardise the Uruguay Round and
would increase protectionism.63 It also saw liberalisation, which would reduce
domestic prices, as a way to increase consumers’ standard of living. The Keidanren
soon gained important allies in internationalist bureaucrats in MITI and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Saadia Pekkanen, the country’s first
victory in the GATT’s dispute settlement process in 1988 became a ‘turning point’
for these bureaucrats’ support for the international institution: ‘[T]he perception was
no longer that the rules of the GATT game were stacked against Japan . . . . [I]t
became clear that international legal rules could be used to Japan’s advantage as it
attempted to ward off complaints from its trade partners.’64 Like the Keidanren,
these officials sought to soften Japan’s intransigence over agriculture to make certain
that the Uruguay Round talks did not collapse, and with it, the new dispute
settlement process that could help to protect Japanese interests. 65 
The Keidanren’s arguments, which the mass media helped to promote, became
more powerful within the national arena when the Uruguay talks reached an
impasse in late 1990 and the Japanese economic ‘bubble’ began to burst earlier that
year. Perhaps indicative of the Keidanren’s impact, a May 1990 survey of Japanese
public opinion showed that ‘65 percent expressed support for some form of rice
liberalization. . . . Support for continuation of the rice import ban fell to 30 percent
from almost 50 percent 18 months earlier.’66 Reflecting the change in public opinion,
the political parties shifted their positions. First, two opposition parties supported
rice liberalisation in 1990 and 1992. Second, a number of leading figures in the LDP
made public statements supporting a partial opening of the rice market.67 Many of
these statements linked a shift in Japan’s strategy to the successful conclusion of the
Uruguay Round. Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa captured the emerging consensus
in laying out his agenda to the Diet in January 1993:
Japan’s economic development owes much to the maintenance of the international free
trading system, and there can be no disagreement with the idea that the maintenance of this
free trading system is a prerequisite to continued economic development not only in Japan
When norms clash: Japan and the GATT/WTO 17
61 Rapkin and George, ‘Rice Liberalization’, pp. 84–7.
62 Yoshimatsu, Internationalization, p. 189.
63 Yahiro Toshikuni, ‘Uruguai Raundo Wo Seikou Saseneba Naranai’, (Uruguay Round Must be
Successful), Keidanren Geppo¯ (August 1990), pp. 32–5.
64 Saadia M. Pekkanen, ‘International Law, the WTO, and the Japanese State: Assessment and
Implications of the New Legalized Trade Politics’, Journal of Japanese Studies, 27:1 (2001), pp. 57–8.
The case in question involved Canada’s allegation that Japan’s tariff classification had discriminated
against the import of Canadian lumber.
65 Pekkanen, ‘International Law, the WTO, and the Japanese State’, p. 54.
66 Quoted in Rapkin and George, ‘Rice Liberalization’, p. 70.
67 Several important statements are listed chronologically in Satoshi Isaka, ‘International Stakes Prompt
Japanese Leaders to Shift’, Nikkei Weekly, 8 June 1991, p. 9.
but worldwide. If the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations end in discord, that could spur the
rise of protectionism and have a grave impact upon the global economy. Japan is thus
determined to join together with other leading countries in continuing to work for an early
and successful conclusion of the negotiations. While agriculture is an area in which all
countries face difficult problems, I intend to make the utmost efforts for a solution based
upon mutual cooperation under our basic policy.68
Although Miyazawa would still seek special status for rice,69 expanding liberalisation
to agricultural products was now identified with the national interest. As his successor,
Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, explained to the nation, ‘[i]t bodes well for the
world economy’s future that the GATT Uruguay Round was finally concluded last
December . . . . In concluding these negotiations, Japan accepted the draft Agreement
on Agriculture according rice special treatment regarding tariffication and subjecting
other agricultural products to tariffication. This was a most heart-rending decision
made after strenuous consideration in recognition of the broader national interest in
the maintenance and strengthening of the free trading system.’70
With the policy agenda affirming the legitimacy of the liberalisation norm, several
institutions were changed to reinforce practices associated with the norm. On comple-
tion of the Uruguay Round, both houses of the Diet ratified the WTO agreement in
December 1994 and, by virtue of being ‘promulgated’, the WTO agreement became
incorporated into Japanese law and acquired the force of law. In addition, numerous
national laws were revised to accord with WTO practices.71 Among these, Prime
Minister Hosokawa proposed and the Diet approved a revision of the 1942 Food
Control Law. As Aurelia George Mulgan concludes, the 1994 ‘law encapsulated the
most fundamental postwar restructuring of the Food Control system governing the
domestic trade in staple grains, principally rice. Amongst other things, the revision
allows for greater competition in rice collection and distribution. . . . The role of the
government in this market has also become smaller.’72
The heightened salience of the trade liberalisation norm in the domestic arena
also is evidenced by the prominent role the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
occupies on the government’s agenda. Japan has appealed to the WTO to protest
other countries’ unfair trade practices 11 times since 1994, a stark contrast with the
five cases filed during the entire GATT period. To facilitate the country’s use of the
dispute settlement mechanism, MITI set up a new advisory committee to evaluate
the consistency of foreign trade practices with the WTO agreements. Although the
‘legalization’ of Japan’s trade strategy is thought to stem from some bureaucrats’
conclusion that trade rules can serve their interests vis-à-vis other countries,73 the
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norm’s obligations are having a wider impact. Following the country’s loss of a case
in 1998 regarding its quarantine practices, Japan removed the offending procedures
and sought to institute new regulations that would be consistent with the WTO
agreements.74
The bursting of the ‘bubble’ economy and the ensuing economic recession led the
Keidanren to redouble its efforts to win the removal of the formal and informal
bureaucratic and administrative practices that enable the government to regulate
economic activity. At this time, there were over 10,000 rules requiring government
permission for, or certification of different economic activities. The Keidanren cast
its arguments in terms of the country’s material interests, suggesting that deregul-
ation, like liberalisation, would spur the economy’s recovery. As Isao Nakauchi,
Keidanren vice chairman, explained:
To achieve full economic recovery, supported by structural expansion in domestic demand, we
need extensive deregulatory measures that will reform Japan’s economic structure and permit
the creation of new businesses and industries. Comprehensive deregulation is crucial to the
creation of an economic society which is in tune with globalization and which benefits
ordinary consumers, alleviating price differentials between domestic and overseas markets and
opening up Japanese markets. The issue of deregulation has great significance today, since it
is necessary to achieve a transition away from bureaucratic control and central authority
toward a uniquely Japanese people-oriented society, led by citizens and private enterprise.75
This argument would soon resonate with many as the continuing economic down-
turn called into question the utility of existing practices and led to a growing belief
within the polity that over-regulation had raised the domestic costs of production,
decreased the competitiveness of Japanese firms, and therefore, had made economic
recovery more difficult.76
Unable to rejuvenate an economy, which in the words of the prime minister was
in ‘dire straits’ and ‘very grim’, the LDP suffered a historic loss in the July 1993
elections.77 The first non-LDP prime minister, Morihiro Hosokawa, quickly ‘demanded
that key ministries specify and implement sweeping liberalization measures as soon
as possible’.78 Hosokawa established the Advisory Group for Economic Structural
Reform, headed by Gaishi Hiraiwa, the Keidanren chairman, to formulate policies
for rebuilding the economy. This group’s report, which many likened as the Maekawa’s
successor, noted that ‘regulations only strengthen the rigidity of economic society
and block future economic restructuring’, and included a detailed list of regulations
to be eliminated and a blueprint for the deregulation process.79 Hosokawa, summaris-
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ing the central recommendations of the Hiraiwa Report to the nation in his March
1994 Diet speech, pledged that his government would fulfil them:
In laying the foundations for a new era of development, it is imperative that we demolish those
systems and practices that are no longer compatible with the needs of the times . . . . [I]t is
essential that we make a determined effort for economic reform and administrative reform,
both for ourselves and so that we can fulfill our responsibilities to the international
community. . . . [W]e intend to move toward making non-regulation the norm and regulation
the exception in the economic sphere. . . . [W]e need to ensure that the Japanese market is open
to the rest of the world in accordance with international trade rules by promoting further
deregulation and other measures to improve market access and rectify price differentials,
ensuring greater transparency in government procurement procedures, strengthening the Office
of the Trade and Investment Ombudsman, and enhancing the import infrastructure.80
Upon taking office in July 1994 Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama continued
Hosokawa’s deregulatory impulse. In December, Murayama established the Com-
mission on Administrative Reform. This body, recommended by the Hiraiwa
committee, comprised representatives from think tanks, academia, labour unions,
journalism, and business; its writ was to monitor the progress of deregulation and
propose reforms at any time. One unusual aspect of the commission was that ‘open
debates between government officials, business people, and opinion leaders were held
to demonstrate whose arguments on deregulation were reasonable and convincing. . . .
This procedure was introduced in the hope that it would reveal the selfishness of
government agencies and industries that were reluctant to take deregulation
seriously.’81 Acknowledging the legitimacy of deregulation, Murayama shifted the
persuasive burden to those who wanted to maintain regulations. He informed his
cabinet in January 1995 that, ‘in formulating the deregulation promotion plan,
reasons should be given to explain why certain existing institutions or operations
must be maintained contrary to the suggestions and requests from inside and
outside Japan’.82
The continued economic recession and slow pace of concrete deregulation increased
support for further initiatives and led successive governments, headed by LDP and
non-LDP politicians, to call for the elimination of restrictive regulations and focus
on the benefits from doing so. The goal, as Prime Minister Murayama explained to
the Diet in September 1995, was to ‘enhance free economic mechanisms in which
market principles work more effectively. . . .’83 Similar reforms soon spread to the
financial system, as Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto explained to the Diet in
1997, ‘to create an open and fair financial system which is attractive to users and can
smoothly supply capital to growth sectors beginning with new businesses’.84 In
August 1998, the new prime minister, Keizo Obuchi explained to the Diet, that he
would use ‘as a guide the process by which the United States and some European
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countries have rebuilt their economies since the 1980s’. He would ‘promote measures
for deregulation’ to ‘create a society where foreign companies will move into Japan
drawn by our attractive business environment’.85
By the end of the 1990s, the legitimacy of the trade liberalisation norm had
reached unprecedented heights. While there is still resistance to deregulation, the
major political parties supported deregulation initiatives in the 1996 elections,
indicating that liberalisation is firmly on the agenda even in this area. In taking
stock of the deregulation movement in the late 1990s, Steven Vogel concludes that
‘[t]he economic crisis now makes it almost impossible to oppose reform outright.
Thus, the natural proponents of reform may restrain their enthusiasm, but the
opponents must also moderate their dissent. Farmers and unions and regulated
industries must focus on shaping the terms of liberalisation rather than opposing it
altogether.’86
Discussion
A longitudinal analysis of Japan’s relationship with a fundamental norm of the
postwar international trading system reveals a strikingly slow rate of internalisation.
The finding is puzzling both for realist and mainstream constructivist theories of
international politics. From the perspective of Realism, Japan should have been
most susceptible to US pressure for trade liberalisation in the early postwar years
when relative power disparities between the two states were greatest. Despite US
preferences for trade liberalisation, domestic interest groups effectively defended
mercantilist practices well into the 1980s. And whereas prominent constructivist
scholars of international relations have argued that the influence of national
understandings is significantly reduced ‘once a norm has become institutionalized in
the international system’, Japan’s relationship with the GATT demonstrates that this
is not always the case.87
The internalisation of the GATT/WTO trade liberalisation norm has followed a
stop-and-go pattern in Japan. The halting nature of the process suggests that pre-
existing norms are not easily pushed aside but continue to infuse the beliefs of
domestic actors even after important elites have proclaimed their obsolescence.
Against a backdrop of longstanding and deep national attachment to a body of
mercantilist ideas and practices, the domestic salience of the trade liberalisation
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norm increased in three phases: first in the early 1980s; again in the mid-1980s; and
finally in the mid-1990s, when the norm attained a high level of salience along the
measures developed here.
Each phase of increased salience was initiated by domestic actors who were
motivated to challenge the appropriateness of existing understandings on instru-
mental rather than normative grounds. The first and second phases of normative
shift were precipitated by massive pressure from the EC and, more importantly, the
US, both of whom demanded that Japan reduce a large number of non-tariff
barriers to trade and thereby further open its market to foreign goods. Faced with
calls for protectionist legislation in the US Congress, the Keidanren and a series of
prime ministers came to recognise that the benefits of trade liberalisation would
exceed the costs of decreased revenues in the event that foreign markets were closed
to Japanese exports. In the third phase, calls for increased liberalisation accompanied
Japan’s worsening macroeconomic crisis. As overall GDP growth stagnated and the
real estate and financial bubbles burst, the Keidanren recognised that the only hope
for avoiding a real catastrophe lay in the maintenance of an open world trading
system. As the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations began to break down, it
increased its activities at home.
Although an economic interest explanation can account for a shift in the pre-
ferences of key societal and political actors in Japan, the widespread legitimacy of
mercantilism amongst the broader public helps to explain the limited success of their
efforts to effect an increase in the salience of the trade liberalisation norm in domestic
debates over Japanese trade policy. Moreover, the proponents of normative change
confronted a range of domestic institutions developed to support mercantilist
practices and the constituencies that benefited from them. For example, before the
creation of the OTO by the Suzuki government, the proponents of trade liberalisation
suffered from a structural disadvantage in domestic policy debates. The OTO had the
effect of bringing private commercial actors into policy debates that historically had
been dominated by state actors and where mercantilist ideas were largely uncontested.
With the establishment and subsequent expansion of the OTO, societal actors such as
the Keidanren were provided with a forum through which they could introduce their
preferences more directly into the government’s decision-making process.
Effecting the internalisation of international norms in democracies where a
competing domestic norm enjoys longstanding support would appear to be con-
tingent on two rather difficult tasks. First, norm entrepreneurs must successfully cast
what at first may be self-interested appeals to international norms in terms of a
broader national interest. Second, they must unravel and transform existing
domestic institutions.
The empirical analysis suggests at least three hypotheses on the processes and
conditions under which pre-existing national norms come to be displaced by new
norms appropriated from the international system:
• As a necessary condition for the displacement of existing national-level norms,
domestic norm entrepreneurs must discursively link the new norm to an encom-
passing conception of the national interest.
• The efforts of domestic norm entrepreneurs to effect normative change will be
enhanced to the degree to which these actors can discursively link continuing
adherence to pre-existing norms to ongoing national ills.
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• The efforts of domestic norm entrepreneurs to increase the domestic salience of
international norms are conditioned by prevailing domestic institutions. If
domestic institutions do not provide for the participation of norm entrepreneurs
in decision-making debates, then the efforts of these actors to effect normative
change are likely to fail.
The limitations of inductively derived hypotheses for theory building are well
known.88 Nonetheless, we believe that the development of a more general theory will
be enhanced if each of these hypotheses is tested across a range of states and issue
areas.89 At a minimum, cross-case comparisons can provide an indication of the
variety of conditions under which domestic agents will agitate for normative change.90
A focus on the domestic politics of norm diffusion in Japan leads us to question
the widely accepted dichotomy between interest-based behaviour that is guided by a
‘logic of consequences’ and norm-guided behaviour that follows a ‘logic of appro-
priateness’.91 Many constructivist scholars have been too quick to assume that norm
entrepreneurs ‘believe in the ideals and values embedded in the norms’.92 For many
domestic actors, however, support for the adoption of an international norm may
reflect little more than narrow self-interest.93 Yet, the actions of self-interested
domestic actors will not necessarily be sufficient to engineer the displacement of
competing domestic norms.
In Japan, longstanding efforts by self-interested commercial interests to effect a
shift toward trade liberalisation proved effective only after foreign economic coercion
coupled with the effects of a deepening economic crisis opened a space in the
domestic political discourse for new ideas. The critical counterfactual question for
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any analysis of the increased salience of the liberalisation norm in Japan is whether
the move from mercantilism would have taken place absent foreign pressure and/or a
bursting of the economic bubble.
There is a significant body of literature suggesting that the origins of change in
widely held societal understandings often are found in the collective experience of a
dramatic event such as economic depression, war, or a shift in alliances. Deborah
Avant argues that ‘[s]uch shocks shift power, open minds to new alternatives, affect
the legitimacy of institutions, and shatter worldviews. All of these matter because
they give political entrepreneurs fodder to call into question and/or delegitimize
established perspectives.’94 Similarly, Judith Goldstein writes, ‘[f]undamentally, it is
the perception, whether warranted or not, of failure in current policy or political
institutions or both that creates the incentive for political elites to [seek] change’.95
The collapse of Japan’s economic bubble presented domestic actors with an
opportunity to challenge widely held beliefs in the appropriateness of economic
nationalism, but did not provide those actors with a new body of ideas toward
which to reorient Japanese trade policy. Japan’s membership in the central institu-
tions of the global economic system, specifically the GATT/WTO, provided grounds
for arguing the legitimacy of a move toward freer trade. International trade norms
might not have provided the proximate cause of Japan’s movement away from
mercantilism, but they made such a move possible. Taking advantage of a window
of opportunity created by Japan’s declining macroeconomic fortunes, the proponents
of trade liberalisation found an argument for rejecting economic nationalism in the
international responsibilities required by membership in international trade organis-
ations. A second counterfactual question is thereby suggested: Would Japan have
moved toward trade liberalisation absent the existence of an international institution
devoted to reducing restrictions on global trade?
The implicit answer is of course, no. But to stress the importance of extant
international institutions devoted to promoting trade liberalisation on Japan’s
movement toward freer trade is not to argue that the institutions directly ‘caused’
Japan to open its markets. Rather, the move toward trade liberalisation was con-
tingent on the actions of domestic actors; actions that the norms of the GATT/
WTO system made possible and more likely.96
24 Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis
94 Deborah Avant, ‘From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War’,
International Organization, 54:1 (2000), pp. 41–72. See too Farrell, ‘Transnational Norms and
Military Development’, pp. 63–102; Jeffrey W. Legro, ‘Whence American Internationalism?’,
International Organization, 54:2 (2000), pp. 253–89; Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson, ‘Altered
States: Explaining Domestic Institutional Change’, British Journal of Political Science, 29:1 (1999),
pp. 177–203; and William B. Heller, Philip Keefer, and Mathew D. McCubbins, ‘Political Structure
and Economic Liberalization: Conditions and Causes from the Developing World’, in Paul W. Drake
and Mathew McCubbins (eds.), The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the
Modern World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
95 Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1993), p. 13.
96 For a discussion on the difference between strictly causal explanations and explanations that identify
the conditions that make social action possible, see Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Norms versus Numbers:
Multilateralism and the Rationalist and Reflexivist Approaches to Institutions – a Unilateral Plea for
Communicative Rationality’, in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and
Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
As domestic actors search about for new ideas to legitimate their self-interested
preferences, the norms and institutions of the international system often provide
them. Domestic political entrepreneurs thus become international norm entre-
preneurs. Over time, however, the two motivational bases for behaviour – a logic of
consequences and logic of appropriateness – may converge. As Hendrik Spruyt
writes, ‘[w]hat may start out as utilitarian calculi by individual actors to champion
certain norms can, over time, take on the form of a given [moral guideline or as a
taken-for-granted] script’.97 Or as Andrew Hurrell put it: ‘Words are not always
cheap. The reasons for making normative claims or framing interests in normative
language may well be purely instrumental. . . . [They] may also reflect straightforward
calculations of interest. . . . But entering into a particular debate and accepting
particular principles, ideas and arguments shapes and constrains the sorts of
arguments that can be made in the future and provides institutional and normative
platforms for different forms of political mobilization.’98
Fifteen years ago, Robert Keohane argued that both rationalistic and reflective
approaches to the study of international institutions ‘share a common blind spot:
neither pays sufficient attention to domestic politics. . . . Both Kenneth Waltz’ “second
image” – the impact of domestic politics on international relations – and Peter
Gourevitch’s “second image reversed” need to be taken account of, in their different
ways by the rationalist and reflective approaches.’99 One of the hypothesised benefits
of enriching the study of international institutions with a focus on domestic politics
was a synthesis between the rationalist and reflexivist modes of theorising. An
historical analysis of Japan’s relationship with central institutions of the inter-
national political economy suggests that Keohane was not far off the mark. Social
agents at the level of the international system as well as within states exhibit
behaviour that is both rational and norm-governed. The challenge for scholars
remains uncovering the ways in which these two motives for behaviour interact
within historical, cultural, and institutional contexts to produce political outcomes.
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